The recent …nancial crisis and the associated decline in economic activity have raised some important questions about economic activity and its links to the …nancial sector. This paper introduces an index of …nancial stress-an index that was used in real time by the sta¤ of the Federal Reserve Board to monitor the crisis-and shows how stress interacts with real activity, in ‡ation and monetary policy. We de…ne what we call a stress event-a period a¤ected by stress in both shock variances and model coe¢ cients-and describe how …nancial stress a¤ects macroeconomic dynamics. We also examine what constitutes a useful and credible measure of stress and the role of monetary policy. We address these questions using a richly parameterized Markov-switching VAR model, estimated using Bayesian methods. Our results show that allowing for time variation is important: the constant-parameter, constant-shockvariance model is a poor characterization of the data. We …nd that periods of high-stress coe¢ cients in general, and stress events in particular, line up well with …nancial events in recent U.S. history. We …nd that a shift to a stress event is highly detrimental to the outlook for the real economy, and that conventional monetary policy is relatively weak during such periods. Finally, we argue that our …ndings have signi…cant implications for DSGE modeling of …nancial events other than standard business cycle ‡uctuations pointing away from linearized DSGE models toward either MS-DSGE models or fully nonlinear models solved with global methods.
Introduction
The United States continues to struggle to crawl out from under the …nancial crisis of and the ensuing recession. By most accounts, the roots of the crisis were the bursting of the housing bubble and the associated collapse of the market for mortgage backed securities. The resulting turmoil spread across a number of asset classes and markets, enhancing counterparty risks, seizing up interbank funding markets, severely aggravating liquidity problems among banks, sharply widening risky spreads in capital markets, and leading ultimately to the collapse of major …nancial institutions. The macroeconomic implications were severe and long lived: As …nancial market developments fed real-side economic outcomes and vice versa, U.S. stock market wealth fell from its peak in 2007 by 50 percent, real estate wealth declined by an unprecedented 15 percent, while the unemployment rate doubled in less than two years. 1 At the time, there were few if any macroeconomic models up to the task of explaining this outcome, even after the fact.
Financial factors have long been recognized as being important for understanding macroeconomic dynamics; for examples see Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyup, Stein and Wilcox (1993) . And yet the inclusion of …nancial frictions within dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models has been a notably recent phenomenon. One reason why modeling …nancial frictions was neglected is that it is empirically challenging. As the survey articles by Kashyup and Stein (1994) and Hubbard (1998) make clear, it has been remarkably di¢ cult to uncover signi…cant e¤ects of …nancial frictions in macroeconomic time-series data. Indeed, with the noteworthy exceptions of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG 1999) , DSGE models with …nancial frictions have all sprung out of the experience of the recent …nancial crisis and subsequent recession. 2 In this paper, we will argue that a reason why statistically signi…cant and macroeconomically important linkages have been elusive is because the importance of …nancial factors tend to be episodic in nature. In "normal times," …rms make investment decisions on the basis of whether a project's expected rate of return exceeds the after-tax user cost of capital, and then having made that decision, seek the …nancing that completes the deal that has already been decided. In such times, the …nancing decision is, in some sense, subordinate to all the real-side 1 According to the US ‡ow of funds accounts, stock market wealth fell from 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q1 by 50 percent, or about $11 trillion, before recovering somewhat thereafter. Real estate wealth fell from its local maximum in 2006:Q4 to 2009:Q1 by 15 percent or about $7 trillion. This amounts to more than a year's worth of nominal GDP. The civilian unemployment was 5.0 percent at the NBER business cycle peak in December 2007 and reached10 percent in October 2009. Brunnermeier (2009) provides an early description of what happened in …nancial markets during the crisis. 2 Another exception is the model of …nancial frictions and housing of Iacoviello (2005) although that paper came out of the housing boom that was a precursor to the recession of 2008-9. decisions the …rm must undertake, at least with established …rms in advanced countries where banking and …nancial systems are e¢ cient; …nance "doesn't matter". 3 ' 4 In other times, however, when the …nancial system is not operating normally, …nancing cannot be taken as given, even for some well-established …rms. Financial frictions, stemming from information asymmetries and the associated moral hazard issues, become important as …rms …nd that lending terms and standards tighten, rendering the interest rate a much less reliable metric of the cost of funds, broadly de…ned.
During such times, which we will call stress events, the terms of credit and indeed its availability cannot be taken for granted; in such circumstances, credit can seem like it is the only thing that matters.
Our contention that there are stress events that are episodic in nature, together with the associated interdependency of the …nancial sector and the macroeconomy, leads us to examine the issue in a nonlinear, multivariate framework. In particular, we build on the work of Sims, Waggoner and Zha (SWZ 2008) by employing a richly parameterized Markov switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) model, estimated with Bayesian methods. 5 Our primary focus is on whether the economy behaves di¤erently during periods of high stress, as the story sketched above suggests.
Does the economy propagate shocks-transmit crises-di¤erently during such periods? Thus we will investigate whether the VAR coe¢ cients shift over time, and whether these shifts coincide with established events in U.S. economic and …nancial history. Mindful of the possibility that …nancial stress could arise from a rare event shock, we also explicitly allow for switching in the variances of shocks-or variance switching, for short. Besides being an important issue in its own right, allowing for variance switching is important to avoid biasing results toward the erroneous …nding of coe¢ cient switching. As in the literature on the sources of the great moderation, variance switching and coe¢ cient switching are rivals in explaining the data. And just as authors have debated explaining whether it was "good luck," as represented by time variation in the variances of shocks, that explains the great moderation, or whether it was "good policy," as represented by shifts in policy rule coe¢ cients, similar issues in econometrics and inference arise here. 6 3 Of course, the cost and terms of …nance, on average, in normal times, will in ‡uence the hurdle rate for investment. 4 The verisimilitude for the statement in the text becomes clear when one thinks of the contrasting case of when a start-up. In such circumstances, acquisition of …nancing is nearly always a preoccupation of the entrepreneur regardless of the expected rate of return of the project. 5 The MS literature began with Hamilton (1989) . Applications of MS have been legion. Most contributions have focussed on monetary policy e¤ectiveness, such as explaining the great moderation. See, e.g., Sims and Zha (2006) among other contributions. 6 Recall that Cogley and Sargent (CS 2002) argued, using a VAR that allowed for drifting coe¢ cients, that changes in policy were responsible for the great moderation. Sims and Zha (2006) countered, arguing that omitting time variation in shocks would bias results in the direction of …nding variantion in coe¢ cients. In their MS-VAR model, Sims and Zha found that the best …tting model needed only regime switching in shock variances. CS (2005) added stochastic volatility to CS (2002) and found that coe¢ cient switching was still important.
In carrying out this research, we introduce a …nancial stress index that was formulated and used-on the ‡y, as it were-by the Federal Reserve Board sta¤ during the crisis to analyze …nancial conditions and assess their macroeconomic implications for senior sta¤ and the Board of Governors.
Thus, a second contribution of this paper will be assessing the e¢ cacy of the Board sta¤'s measure of …nancial stress for nowcasting the economic and …nancial environment.
Ours is not the …rst paper in this area, broadly de…ned. Since the onset of the crisis, DSGE models with …nancial frictions have sprung up, building on the canonical DSGE papers of BGG (1999), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) , including Iacoviello (2005) , Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007) , Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) . These papers have added insight to thinking about …nancial frictions as a source of shock ampli…cation, but in most instances, their depiction of model economies allows for a single time-invariant steady state; no role for instability, volatility dynamics or important nonlinear e¤ects is considered. There are also Markov switching DSGE models, including Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2010) . However Liu et al. is focussed on the ordinary ups and downs of business cycles, rather than …nancial stress. 7 The myriad ways in which …nancial stress manifests itself-widened spreads of risky bonds over Treasury bond rates, jumps in volatility, substantial increases in liquidity premiums in bond markets, shifts in the equity premium-together with the multiplicity of channels through which stress can operate, leads us to avoid the restrictions implied by a DSGE model, at least until the literature identi…es the most important channels of e¤ect. The MS-VAR model is particularly appropriate to model the abrupt, discrete changes in economic dynamics as observed during the recent crisis and as we will document below. Among the empirical models in the area Lown and Morgan (2006) examine the interaction of real variables and the responses to the Fed's Senior Loan O¢ cers'Opinion Survey in a quarterly time-invariant VAR. Among the very few Markov switching models that pay attention to …nancial stress that we are aware of is Davig and Hakkio (2010) who, like us, employ an index of …nancial stress, however, their model is much simpler than ours and omits any consideration of monetary policy or price determination. Kaufmann and Valderama (2007) look at switching in VAR models with credit and asset prices, but do not examine …nancial stress. 8 To presage the results, taking a standard, time-invariant Gaussian VAR model as a benchmark, 7 Schorfheide (2005) and also use Markov switching in DSGE models to study monetary policy switching. 8 Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009) look at the information content of credit spreads from the ground up by constructing data from data from secondary bond market quotes. In an related paper, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) construct a credit spread index from …rm-speci…c information that predicts future economic activity and show that it is not the expected default premium of individual …rms but rather the market-wide portion that drives ‡uctuations.
we …nd substantial evidence of nonlinearities or non-Gaussian shock processes: the linkage between …nancial stress and the macroeconomy is not at all well described by the simple linear benchmark.
Second, variance switching alone is not su¢ cient to characterize departures from the benchmark model; unlike the business cycle characterization of SZ (2006) , or the depiction of the drivers of the most recent recession described by Stock and Watson (2012) , both of which explain the phenomena under study as arising from unusual sequences of shocks, we …nd that coe¢ cient switching-and hence, nonlinear dynamics-is an important part of the mechanism linking …nancial stress and macroeconomic outcomes. 9 Third, we …nd that the Board sta¤'s …nancial stress index is a useful tool that can aid in capturing periods of …nancial stress in quasi-real time. Fourth, our results suggest that conventional monetary policy is not particularly e¤ective in times of high …nancial stress; a much more powerful tool is to induce a switch from a high-stress state back to "normal times." We argue that these results have meaningful implications for the construction of DSGE models. While linearized DSGE models may be useful for thinking about garden variety business ‡uctuations and how …nancial factors can amplify shocks, to the extent that one is interested in the sort of dynamics that underscored the 2008-9 …nancial crisis-which, after all, was the motivation for many or most of the models in this area-linearized DSGE models will not be up to the task.
Rather, MS-DSGE models, such as F. , or fully articulated nonlinear models that are solved with global methods will be necessary. Examples of the latter include Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2010) . Mendoza (2010) , He and Krishnamurthy (2012) , and J. . 10 On the empirical side, it also follows that inference regarding the relationship between …nancial stress and the macroeconomy that is gleaned from a constant parameter model may be inappropriate.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the history of …nancial stress in the United States. We also introduce our data and link these events to the data. The third section discusses our modeling framework and econometric strategy while the fourth presents our results. A …fth and …nal section sums up and concludes. 9 Bloom (2009) develops a model in which, broadly speaking, time-varying second-moment shocks add a non-linear element that accentuates the conventional impulse responses of a linear Gaussian VAR in a manner not unlike what stress events do in this paper.
1 0 Taking Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) as the particular example, models of this class can allow for instabilities and periodic epidodes of volatility, driven in part by ocassionally binding …nancial constraints. Such models emphasize the highly non-linear ampli…cation e¤ects caused by leverage and feedback e¤ects from asset prices. Risk is sometimes endogenous in such models so that …nancial innovations can lead to better sharing of exogenous risk, but higher endogenous systemic risk as agents optimally respond to the safer environment they …nd themselves in. Externalities can lead to socially inappropriate levels of leverage, excess volatility and higher correlations of asset prices.
Measuring …nancial stress

Some history
To casual observers, …nancial stress would seem like a recent phenomenon. But it has been more prevalent than one might think. Students of banking history know that there were banking crises in the U.S. in 1837, 1857, 1873, 1907 and 1933 . It is only recently that crises have become rare. But the absence of full-blown crises does not mean that there has not been episodes of …nancial stress. There were …nancial crises long before troubles at hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns showed up in the spring of 2007. Many of these originated from outside the country, but not the S&L crisis wherein more than a thousand mostly small, regional …nancial institutions collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The S&L crisis has been cited as both a cause and a propagation mechanism of the 1991 recession and the subsequent "jobless recovery".
The Board sta¤' s FSI
As the …nancial crisis began to take hold in 2007, the paucity of …nancial channels in the Board sta¤'s macromodels became apparent. To augment the existing models, and to capture the higher frequency dynamics that no quarterly model could absorb in real time, the sta¤ of the Federal
Reserve Board constructed a Financial Stress Index (FSI). Built up from daily data, the earliest versions were used for more-or-less instantaneous assessment of developments as they unfolded. 11
To be clear, our purpose here is not to construct the best, ex post, measure of …nancial stress; it seems likely that any such index would turn out to be optimal only for a particular episode in history. We are more interested in the index the Board's sta¤ actually used, in part because crises of any sort are likely to be approached with ad hoc tools conjured up in real time. One contribution of this paper will be our ability to assess whether the construction and use of this particular FSI was a useful step for the Board's sta¤ to have undertaken.
The index is deliberately focussed on capital market measures of stress, as opposed to banking measures. There are costs and bene…ts associated with this focus. As we noted in the introduction, …nancial stress manifests itself through both price and non-price channels, and in both capital markets and in banking. The most common source of data for (something like) stress in banking is the Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), also a product of the Federal Reserve. 12
While there is a great deal of merit to the SLOOS, the fact that it is a quarterly survey and only comes out a month or so after the survey is conducted represents a signi…cant drawback for our purposes. The short sample of the SLOOS also represents an impediment. There are capitalmarkets based measures of banking stress, such as the well-known TED spread, but these too have own problems. 13 Finally, there are other indexes of …nancial stress, including some constructed by the Federal Reserve Banks, which mostly use principal components analysis of fairly large numbers of series, including some we use, as well as banking related series, and the levels of interest rates which we prefer to avoid. 14 They share some similarities to the one we use. However, none of 1 1 The FSI used here is based on an index described in Nelson and Perli (2005) modi…ed to allow a longer historical series. The FSI is constructed and maintained by the Macroeconomics and Quantitative Studies section of the Division of Research and Statistics. The source data are daily. Carlson, Lewis and Nelson (2012) re…ne the Nelson and Perli (2005) rendition of the index.
1 2 See, e.g. Lown and Morgan (2006) . For details on the Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/ 1 3 The TED spead is the di¤erence between interbank lending rates and the rate on short-term US Treasury securities. However, its de…nition has changed over time. The LIBOR-OIS spread, which is arguably better than the TED spread some purposes, only goes back to 2001. Both of these indexes measure only a subset of the phenomena captured by the FSI.
1 4 The St. Louis Fed's STLFSI is the …rst principal component of a variety of variables, some of which that are also in the FSI, plus the levels of some interest rates. It starts in 1993. For details, see Kliesen and Smith (2010) .
The Cleveland Fed's CFSI uses daily data from credit, foreign exchange, equity and interbank markets and dates these series goes back as far as ours and not all are available at business daily frequency. 15;16 Table 2 .2 below describes the constituent parts of the FSI. As can be seen, the index includes two variables that measure risky spreads on bonds (#1 and 2), two that capture liquidity premiums on bonds (#6 and 7), 17 three variables that capture market volatility as measured from options prices (#4, 5 and 9) in bond and equity markets, a variable measuring the slope of the term structure at the short end (#3) and …nally a measure of the equity premium (#8). Data availability limits the start date of the (monthly version of the) index to 1988:12; the last observation we use is 2011:12, leaving 277 observations. The components of the FSI capture di¤erent aspects of risk and uncertainty in capital markets.
Risk premiums, for example, re ‡ect default risk whereas liquidity premia capture unwillingness to trade. The two concepts are likely to be associated but are not the same. Table 2 .3 shows the correlation matrix for the series. In general, the components are correlated, of course, and sometimes quite strongly, but not so much that one would argue that a series is redundant. back to 1994. See also Oet et al. (2011) .
The Kansas City Fed's index (KCFSI) is constructed using principal components of 11 monthly …nancial market variables. See Hakkio and Keeton (2009) for details.
1 5 Business daily frequency availability is of no particular relevance for the application considered in this paper but the advantage of being able to monitor developments in real time and at high frequency is obvious, particularly for central banks and …nancial market participants themselves. In this regard, it is also worth noting that one drawback of the use of principal components is that the index will necessarily be revised even if the underlying components are not.
1 6 The International Monetary Fund has also constructed a FCI with the restriction that it be applicable to 17 countries which limits the data that can be used. See also Beaton et al. (2009) and Hatzius et al. (2010) . 1 7 The on-the-run premium is the di¤erence in yield between just-issued Treasury bonds and the identical bond from the previous auction, corrected for the di¤erence in term to maturity. The on-the-run premium-or liquidity premium-re ‡ects the fact that trading in older bonds is not particularly deep. Stearns stands out as one of particularly high stress. In an appendix on robustness, we investigate perturbations to our measure of …nancial stress. On the other hand, it is not the case that any headline generating event manifests itself in high stress: the Peso crisis in 1994-95 generated much discussion, and a great deal of activity at the U.S. Treasury, and yet resulted in scarcely any movement in the FSI.
Econometric Methodology
The model
Our investigation is concerned with uncovering nonlinear and possibly state-dependent relationships between …nancial stress-which appears, at least super…cially, to have non-linear univariate dynamics-and key macroeconomic variables. The Markov-switching framework is ideal for our purposes. First, and most obviously, it provides a formal framework to investigate the presence of nonlinearities. Moreover, it does so by allowing discrete shifts, which for the questions under study, is more appropriate than the alternative time-varying parameters framework. Second, it can distinguish between variance switching as the source of time variation, and coe¢ cient switching that alters the transmission of …nancial shocks to the real economy. Regime switching in coe¢ cients would suggest either that agents change their behavior during episodes of high …nancial stress, or that the environment they face is materially di¤erent; taken at face value, regime switching in shocks would suggest that …nancial crises are a matter of happenstance. And third, the MS-VAR framework allows us to investigate feedback and potential ampli…cation e¤ects between the real and the …nancial sector.
The combination of high dimensionality of the model we have in mind combined with the relatively short sample of data with which we must work presents a challenge from a methodological point of view. Fortunately, recent advances in econometrics facilitate our investigation. In particular, we employ state-of-the-art Bayesian econometric tools for MS-VAR models, as developed by SWZ (2008) . In this section, we lay out the basic model and discuss our methodology.
We consider (possibly) nonlinear vector stochastic processes of the following form:
where y is an n 1 vector of endogenous variables; s m ; m = v; c are an unobservable (latent) state variables, one each for v ariances, v, and intercepts and coe¢ cients, c; p is the VAR's lag length;
z is a matrix of exogenous variables which we are going to take as 1 n , representing a column vector of constants. A 0 is an n n matrix of parameters describing contemporaneous relationships between the elements of y, C(k) is an 1 n vector of parameters of the exogenous variables and A l (k) is a n n matrix of parameters of the endogenous variables. The values of s m t are elements of f1; 2; :::h m g and evolve according to a …rst-order Markov process:
then the model can be written as
where T is the sample size. Let us designate Y t = fy 0 ; y 1 ; :::y t g as the vector y stacked in the time dimension. We assume that the structural disturbances are conditionally normal:
The reduced form system is then:
As can be seen in equations (3.5) through (3.7), the reduced form contains structural parameters and shocks that make distinguishing regime switching impossible, whereas it is possible in the structural form, equations (3.3). More important for our application, notice that switching in the coe¢ cients, s c , imparts switching in the reduced-form residuals, equations (3.7), as does switching in the structural variance-covariance matrix, through s v . To see the signi…cance of this, consider a model in which only coe¢ cient switching is permitted, so that s v drops out of equations (3.6) and (3.7). There is still time variation in reduced-form shocks and coe¢ cients, (3.5)-(3.7), but that variation is inextricably tied by a single Markov process. Now consider switching in structural shock variances only, so that s c drops out of (3.5)-(3.7). In this instance, the reduced-form coe¢ cients, SZ (2006) showed that failing to do so can severely bias results towards the erroneous …nding of shifts in coe¢ cients. It should be clear from equations (3.4) to (3.7) that for a given dataset the more s v accounts for variability in the data, the smaller the role of s c to explain the variability in the data, and vice versa. Thus it will be important to ensure that shock s is not wrongly attributed to parameter switching; and, therefore, a …nding of coe¢ cient switching that allows for switching in variances will be a noteworthy outcome.
Finally, we will be interested in comparing our preferred MS-VAR model with a constantparameter, constant-variance version, which imposes the restriction h m = 1.
Model Estimation and Evaluation
We employ a blockwise optimization algorithm to estimate the posterior mode, as described in SWZ08 that improves over, for example, the MCEM method proposed by Chib (1996) which can be very time-consuming, particularly for large-dimensional systems. In a …rst step, parameters are divided into blocks and the resulting initial guesses for the parameters are used in a hill-climbing quasi-Newton optimization routine.
To evaluate our models, we use a number of criteria-not merely goodness of …t-as discussed below. Within the realm of …t, however, consistent with standard practice in the Bayesian literature, we compare the marginal data densities (MDDs) of our models. A number of alternative methods have been promoted for computing MDDs, beginning with the standard modi…ed harmonic mean (MHM) calculation of Gelfand and Dey (1994) . However, it has been established that the MHM computation is not likely to work well with models whose posterior distributions are likely to be far from Gaussian as is the case with many Markov switching models. At least three alternatives that have been proposed share the fact that they use weighting functions to approximate the unknown posterior distribution, including the bridge method of Meng and Wong (1996) , a method suggested by Ulrich Müeller of Princeton University in an unpublished paper, and a method by Waggoner and Zha (2011), Appendix B.. We used the entire variety of methods and came up with con ‡icting results. To address the issue, we carried out trials with arti…cial data and found that the method of SWZ (2008) was the most reliable for our purposes. 19
Macro-…nancial Linkages and Financial Stress
We focus on …ve-variable MS-VARs identi…ed using the well-known Choleski decomposition. 20 In particular, let y t = C P R M S 0 where C is the monthly growth in personal consumption expenditures (PCE); P is CPI in ‡ation, excluding food and energy prices (hereinafter, core in ‡a-tion); R is the nominal federal funds rate; M is growth in the nominal M2 monetary aggregate;
and S represents the …nancial stress index. All variables are monthly (or monthly averages of daily rates, where applicable), seasonally adjusted, and expressed at annual rates. The data run from 1988:12 to 2011:12. 21 We are interested primarily in three questions: …rst, whether there are periods of high …nancial stress, and if those periods are marked by di¤erent dynamics than more normal times; second, if indeed there is evidence of regime switching, whether it is con…ned to variance switching, as SZ (2006) …nd, or whether di¤erences in economic behavior, as captured by coe¢ cient switching, better explain the data; and third, whether any regime switching is con…ned to speci…c equations-such as the stress equation alone, or the monetary policy response to stress-as opposed to applying to all equations.
1 9 Among other results, we found that in arti…cial data runs where the true model had two states in shocks and two states in coe¢ cients, the the Müeller and bridge methods would place overly large probabilities on a single-state model for coe¢ cients.
2 0 In future work we will be working with more complicated identi…cation schemes. 2 1 The limiting factor in taking the data back furthr in history is the …nancial stress index. The availability of the series that comprise the index is such that there can be no meaningful extension back in time of the data through a modest narrowing the breadth of the index.
Before proceeding to our results, we discuss brie ‡y our criteria for model selection. Bayesian econometrics lends itself to model assessment on the basis of comparing the marginal data density (marginal likelihood) of alternative models. 22 While we carry out comparisons of this nature, we use broader criteria for model selection. Among these criteria, we place some weight on the plausibility of the model, as captured by the state probabilities and the economic interpretation of their timing and duration in the light of past events. Finally, we also make reference to the log likelihood of the model. Because the posterior mode of the model is proportional to the prior times the likelihood, if the ranking of log likelihoods is seriously out of line with rankings of the marginal data densities (MDDs), it suggests that the prior probabilities might be the dominant force behind the latter ranking. See the appendix for a review of priors.
4.1. Financial stress regimes: Is it just the shocks or do agents change behavior?
At this point, it is useful to introduce a bit of notation in order to facilitate the interpretation of the tables that follow. We designate #v; # = 1; 2; 3 to indicate the number of independent Markov states governing variance switching, and #c to indicate the number of states governing coe¢ cient switching (that is, slope and intercept parameters). Finally, when shifts in structural parameters are constrained to a particular equation(s), the restriction is indicated by adding the letter of the variable, l = fg; C; P; R; M; S, with fg representing a null entry. (Tests of whether variance switching could be restricted to subsets of equations showed that these restrictions were everywhere and always inferior in terms of goodness of …t to models that allowed variance switching in all equations.) So, for example, an MS-VAR with two Markov states in the variances and two in coe¢ cients with the latter restricted to the …nancial stress variable would be designated as 2vS2c.
Our presentation of results begins with Table 4 .1 which focusses on models where switching is entertained in all equations but could be in either variance switching alone or in variances and coe¢ cients. The …rst line of the table shows MDDs. The second line of the table is perhaps the most informative: it shows the di¤erence in the MDD from the best …tting model in the same table. The remaining two lines are essentially reference items that show the posterior mode and log likelihood evaluated at the posterior mode for each model; taken together, these two lines allow 2 2 There are a number of methods outlined in the literature for computing MDDs. The literature indicates that reliance on the standard, modi…ed harmonic means method pioneered by Gelfand and Dey (1994) is not likely to be adequate in situations where the posterior distribution is likely to be far from Gaussian as seems likely to be the case here. The alternatives are all based on constructing weighting distributions as initial approximations from which the posterior distribution can be computed. Some experimentation, with arti…cial data, led us to a method of Waggoner and Zha, which is designed to reduce the sensitivity of MDD calculations to the construction of the weighting matrix by measuring and taking into account the overlap between the weighting function and the posterior distribution. the reader to see how much in ‡uence the prior is having on the rankings of posterior modes on the one hand and how much the MDD calculations are having on the ranking on the other.
There are a number of interesting observations that can be taken from Table 4 by comparison, adding a third Markov state for variances, as in column [3] , improves the …t only in small ways. Thus, the transmission of crises would appear to be not merely a non-Gaussian phenomena, but a non-linear one as well. Third, of the models shown in the table, the model that is favored on purely goodness-of-…t criteria is the 3v2c model, shown in column [6] . 25 This model, with three states in the variances of shocks and two in the VAR coe¢ cients, is obviously fairly elaborate, and indeed based solely on MDD computations, an even more elaborate model, the 3v3c speci…cation, not shown in the table, is better still. The improvement in …t over the 3v2c model, however, is very small and, more important, the model's economic dynamics are di¢ cult to interpret. 26 Indeed, as we discuss below, the 3v2c model favored on goodness-of-…t criterion in Table 4 .1 is economically little di¤erent from the 2v2c model in column [5] . The economic dynamics of the two speci…cations are quite similar, a fact will rely on to make more general points 2 3 Evidence of switching in shock variances can taken literally as representing switching between two di¤erent regimes of shocks, or as capturing a single non-Gaussian distribution of shocks represented by mixtures of normals.
2 4 This result, that switching in coe¢ cients is useful in explaining the data, after allowing for switching in shocks, was very robust. The same conclusion obtains when using di¤erent real variables, di¤erent price indexes, and for a number of alterations of the …nancial stress index. We will have more to say about robustness later in the paper.
2 5 We note that the ranking of models based on the posterior densities and log likelihoods (computed at the posterior mode) is in accordance with the rankings by MDDs.
2 6 Unlike the models shown in the table, the ranking of models based on the posterior densities and log likelihoods (computed at the posterior mode) does not accord with the rankings by MDDs for the 3v3c speci…cation. The improvement in MDD from adding the third state in coe¢ cients is of the order of 7 which is not strong evidence based on the usual Bayesian criteria. about economic dynamics later on. 
Whence switching: is it just in stress or everywhere?
This section compares the statistically preferred 3v2c model from Table 4 .1 against models of similar size but restricting coe¢ cient switching to certain equations. We have already established the importance of switching for explaining the data. The idea here is to investigate whether, for example, the switching concerning …nancial phenomena is restricted to just …nancial factors or whether it is more general. It is conceivable, for example, that …nancial crises are associated merely with di¤erent transmission of shocks originating from the …nancial sector but the policy response to this di¤erent …nancial market behavior is unchanged. Similarly, the real and price responses to changes in …nancial market regime could be no di¤erent than in "ordinary times," just larger, in proportion to the shocks. Or it could be the case that changes in …nancial sector behavior is met by induced changes in monetary policy responses, but the real side of the economy responds normally.
An assortment of restricted models are entertained; Table 4 .2 focusses on the ones that are the most economically meaningful as well as those that boasted the best …t. 27 We consider restrictions of coe¢ cient switching to the stress equation, S-arguably the most obvious restriction because as we noted in the Introduction, it is …nancial stress that is so often left out of macro models in general and VARs in particular, due it its episodic importance; to stress and the real economy, CS, on the grounds that it is disparate response of the real economy to unusual developments in stress that motivates concern with the issue in the …rst place; and to stress and monetary policy, RM S ; because at least in principle, it is policy that should respond di¤erently to disproportionate developments in stress. From the perspective of the monetary authority, a shift to a period of high …nancial stress is an exogenous event that puts the authority in a quandary: does it stick to its policy rule on the grounds that consistent monetary behavior is a necessary condition for rational expectations equilibrium to obtain, or does it switch to a policy that is germane to the special conditions of the day? If the former is the case, switching will be observed in the S equation but not in the policy equations; otherwise both sets of equations will exhibit switching. There is also the possibility that policy could switch seemingly on its own, perhaps owing to "taking out insurance" against …nancial or other shocks that do not occur but are thought possible. Indeed it is conceivable that high …nancial stress is caused, in some sense, by switching in monetary policy. Table 4 .2 shows that the data favor switching in all equations, over the restricted speci…cations.
Of the alternative speci…cations, only the 3vCP S2c speci…cation comes even close to the 3v2c case, and even then, not all that close. Moreover, the log likelihood calculations shown in the last row of the table strongly con…rm this conclusion. This means that the dynamics of monetary policy have di¤ered in parts of recent monetary history, and that these changes have coincided with changes in the behavior of other variables, most notably …nancial stress. Indeed, although this causality cannot be formally tested, it seems reasonable to assume that changes in the behavior of …nancial stress induced concomitant changes in the operation of monetary policy. At the same time, however, the limits to what monetary policy can do are indicated by the fact that shifts in monetary policy induced by shifts in …nancial stress were insu¢ cient to leave the behavior of the real economy and in ‡ation unchanged. and capital market developments during …nancial crises would manifest themselves in stress shocks, but this seems not to be the case. Moreover, with the noteworthy exception that the variance of R shocks declines, and the variance of M shocks rises, as one goes from low-stress variance shocks to high, there is little pattern in shocks from state to state. Perhaps the most substantive di¤erence in shocks across regimes is in the covariance terms, which are not shown in the table in order to avoid excessive clutter. In the low-and medium-stress variance states, the covariance terms are small, never exceeding 0.14 in absolute value; in the high-stress variance state, however, the covariance of shocks between C and M , and between P and S, are fairy large and negative at -0.63 and -0.46, respectively. Taken together these observations suggest that periods of …nancial stress and associated poor economic performance are not an outcome of particularly unusual shocks; rather it is the transmission of shocks that explains the transmission of crises. 28 Although the setting is quite di¤erent, this result stands in stark contrast to that of SZ (2006) who argue that for post-war U.S. business cycle switching, it is variance switching that matters with little or no contribution attributable to switching in coe¢ cients. Of greater interest is the probability of being in a high-stress coe¢ cient state, because to be in such a state would indicate fundamentally di¤erent economic behavior, rather than just enhanced volatility. As shown in Figure 4 .2 shows that this was also a period in which the coe¢ cient state was low stress as well. Figure 2 .1 shows that this was also the period in which the FSI itself was at a very low level for an extended period; in addition, interest rates were very low.
In response, it is commonly alleged that …nancial …rms began "chasing yield:" increasing leverage in order to magnify returns; see, e.g., Geanakoplos (2010) among many other references. Back on when the shock variance state is either medium or high, and the coe¢ cient state is high. As can be seen in Figure 4 .3 below, this de…nition eliminates the periods of high-stress coe¢ cients in the early 1990s at which time there was apparently insu¢ cient turbulence to create much in the way of di¢ culties for real economy (although there was, in fact, a mild recession and a slow, "jobless" recovery). Also omitted from this status is the September 11, 2001 attacks and the associated extraordinary provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve that followed those attacks. 30 This de…nition leaves in, however, a spike in 1998 associated with the Russian debt default and the LTCM failure, two spikes that might be associated with the Argentine debt default or the failure of Worldcom, the great recession and a very recent spike connected to the European sovereign debt crisis. The fact that the 2v2c model and the 3v2c model are economically similar is demonstrated by the fact that the state probabilities that the two models have in common does not change markedly with the introduction of the third state in variances. In both speci…cations, it is the case that the high-stress coe¢ cient state is short-lived in duration, on average. The severity of the 2008-9 episode is therefore marked by two unusual phenomena by historical standards: the fact that the high-stress coe¢ cient state lasted as long as it did, and the fact that it was also associated with a period of high-stress shock variances. Based in part on this evidence, we propose a de…nition of a stress event as a period in which the shock variance is in a medium-or high-stress state, as de…ned above, and the coe¢ cient regime is high stress. 31 Figure 4 .4 shows our estimates of stress events de…ned in this way. The …gure reveals that the early-sample periods of high-stress coe¢ cients were not terribly consequential because they were not associated with shock-variance regimes that were conducive to widespread contagion. Table 2 showed the composition of the FSI. As a test of robustness and an exploration of what channels one might wish to investigate in a structural model, we exclude, in the context of our preferred 3v2c speci…cation, each of six classes of components of the FSI. These are risky bond rate spreads (rows 1 and 2 of Table 2 ), the yield spread (row 3), implied bond rate volatilities (lines 4 and 5), on-the-run premiums (line 6 and 7), equity premium (line 8) and the VIX, that is, the implied volatility of the S&P 500 price index (line 9).
None of these subsets of the broader index produced results that were preferred to our base case. In several instances, however, the results were very similar. In particular, omitting the on-the-run premiums or the implied volatilities of bonds made only slight di¤erences in either switching probabilities or model properties. Given that these variables measure market liquidity this …nding suggests either that liquidity is not particularly important or is encompassed by other variables. By contrast, omitting the VIX or especially the risky spreads does make a material di¤erence to the results. Risky spreads measure default risk on corporate bonds, while the VIX measures market perceptions of the riskiness of expected returns on corporate equities. We conclude that explorations using structural models of nonlinearities in the interaction between …nancial markets and the macroeconomy might be pro…tably focused on endogenously generated perceptions of default.
Real-time properties
As we noted in the Introduction, the FSI was constructed and used by the Markov switching aside, the unique aspect of our model is the …nancial stress index. To illustrate how …nancial stress a¤ects the economy, we carry out two counterfactual simulations involving alternative paths for stress (S in the …gures), one carried out during a period of low stress, the other from more strained conditions.
We begin with an autonomous increase in stress during a low-stress period in July 1989. Our period in history is August 1998, during the Russian debt default and associated collapse of This response is in sharp contrast with the previous experiment, carried out in low-stress conditions (with the opposite sign). The implications for real activity end up being quite modest, which would have been well advised at the time since PCE growth was quite strong, on average, during this time.
What this says is that monetary policy, when it has the capacity to do so, is well disposed to respond to increases in stress, holding constant the stress regime, when those increases are moderate and temporary, as was the case in 1998. Arguably, actions by the Federal Reserve to elicit an orderly reorganization of LTCM ensured that this stress event was brief, and monetary policy de…ned in terms of setting the federal funds rate was in a position to ease. The contrast with the 2008-9 so: …nancial stress rises substantially and persistently with the policy intervention. Evidently, in high-stress situations, agents regard conventional policy actions that would normally be bene…cial as con…rmation of incipient …nancial di¢ culties. The resulting higher levels of stress choke o¤ the salutary e¤ects of easy monetary policy. We emphasize that this result is germane to stress events:
in low-stress states, a surprise reduction in the federal funds rate reduces …nancial stress rather than increasing it. We conclude from this that conventional monetary policy actions, in the absence of actions to alleviate the fundamental causes of the stress event, or actions to arrest increases in …nancial stress, will only be modestly helpful for economic performance. At one level, this should not be surprising: it is a homily of economics that would-be policy cures should be tailored to the ultimate causes of the problem as opposed to the symptoms that those causes engender.
Finally we turn to our second class of experiments, a conditional forecast which we favor for its ability to encompass the importance of initial conditions for economic outcomes. As can be seen, PCE growth is much weaker in the high-stress world and this low growth is accompanied elevated levels of …nancial stress, particularly in comparison with the low-stress world. Of signi…cance is that the high-stress state is associated with higher price in ‡ation than in the low-stress state, a …nding that is consistent with the interpretation of a stress event as a negative supply shock that reduces real output and puts upward pressure on prices, all else equal.
All else is not equal here: monetary policy, as measured by the federal funds rate (or the growth rate of M2, not shown) is easier in the high-stress world than otherwise; but with the interpretation of reduced potential output, this easy monetary policy is seen as something of a palliative in that reduces the pain only modestly, and instead leads to upward pressure on prices. As we argued above, true recovery requires a shift to the low-stress state
Conclusions
This paper has considered the implications of …nancial stress for the macroeconomy in the United States using a richly speci…ed Markov-switching vector autoregression model, estimated with stateof-the-art Bayesian methods, and exploiting a unique series for …nancial stress constructed and monitored by the sta¤ of the Federal Reserve Board. Our objective was to uncover whether shifts in the state of the economy have been an important feature of the real-…nancial linkage in the U.S. economy over the period from 1989 to 2011, and the associated question of whether the transmission of …nancial stress di¤ers in some states of the world than others. We also examined whether monetary policy in the high-stress state di¤ers from what it is in low stress states. And we assessed whether the Board sta¤'s Financial Stress Index is up to the task of providing real-time insight on …nancial stress and its relation to macroeconomic outcomes.
Our analysis shows substantial evidence that a single-regime model of the macroeconomy and …nancial stress is inadequate to capture the dynamics of the economy. Moreover, the data show that there have been periodic shifts in both the dynamics of the economy and the variances of stochastic shocks. We further …nd that these shifts are best described as having occurred in all of the model equations, rather than being restricted to subsets of equations. In particular, there is no evidence that the interest-rate reaction function has constant parameters. This …nding implies that inference regarding the conduct of monetary policy that is gleaned from a constant-parameter Gaussian model may be inappropriate for periods when the policy is conditioned on movements in …nancial stress.
Quantitatively, we …nd that output reacts di¤erently to …nancial shocks in times of high …nancial stress than in normal times, with macroeconomic dynamics being highly conditional on the …nancial stress regime: Stress is of negligible importance in "normal" times, but of critical importance when the economy is in a high-stress coe¢ cient state. We also found that the largest single driver of adverse economic events is a switch to what we call a stress event: a period in which the shock variance is at a relatively high-stress level and the coe¢ cient state is also at a high-stress level. It is often the case that stress events occur when shock volatility begins to rise and is followed by the change in coe¢ cient state. The fact that such switches in state can be reliability inferred in real time leads one toward optimism regarding the e¢ cacy of nowcasting stress events. Lastly, we showed that the Federal Reserve sta¤'s use of its …nancial stress index, as ad hoc in its construction as it is, appears to have been an e¢ cacious choice.
The …nding of Markov switching in model coe¢ cients is prevalent together with the observation that conventional monetary policy is not very powerful in high-stress coe¢ cient states speaks to the issue of whether there are con ‡icts in central banks'mandates for price stability and maximum employment on the one hand, and …nancial stability on the other. The issue is whether there exists merely an assignment problem in which …nancial instruments need only be assigned to …nancial goals and monetary instruments to monetary goals, or whether there are times when monetary policy needs to be concerned with the goal of …nancial stability, regardless of …nancial stability instruments. Markov switching is exogenous in this paper, but our …ndings suggest that unless alternative mechanisms can be found to rule out switching to the high-stress coe¢ cient state, it is possible that monetary policy might at times need to contribute to maintaining …nancial stability.
Lastly, we have noted that it is the components of the …nancial stress index that are associated with market perceptions of default risk that are instrumental in driving our results. This suggests that nonlinear structural models aimed at explaining the same sort of quantitative phenomena as this paper would be well advised to assign a prominent role to considerations of default risk.
6. Appendix
Priors
There are two sets of priors of relevance to our model, one on the reduced-form parameters of the VAR conditional on a state, s, and the other on the transition matrix. The priors on the reduced-form VAR are simply the standard Minnesota prior of Litterman (1986) on the lag decay dampening the in ‡uence of long lags. In other words, this prior shrinks the model towards a random walk. Furthermore, it seems reasonable that the importance of a variance decreases with lag length; and that priors on exogenous and deterministic variables, z, be relatively uninformative. Let the relative tightness on the prior on the own lags, non-own lags, and exogenous or deterministic variables be 1 through 3 respectively. The prior variances of the parameters are then speci…ed as:
V ar(x i ) = The priors that apply to switching are less straightforward. Even without restrictions of some sort, A 0 (s t ) and A + (s t ) could, in principle, be estimated straightforwardly, using the method of Chib (1996) for example, but as n or h grows, the curse of dimensionality quickly sets in. The problem is particularly acute in situations where one (or more) of the unobserved states lasts for only a short proportion of the number of total observations, as may be the case for us. The matrix A + can be rewritten as A + (s t ) = D(s t ) +Ŝ A 0 (s t ) whereŜ = [ I n 0 (m n) n ] (6.1) which means that a mean-zero prior can be placed on D which centers the prior on the usual reduced-form random-walk model that forms the baseline prior for most Bayesian VAR models; see e.g. Sims and Zha (1998) for details. The relationship contained in (3.5) means that a prior on D tightens or loosens the prior on a random walk for B.
The fact that the latent state, s;is discrete and that the transition probabilities of states must sum to unity lends itself toward the priors of the Dirichlet form. Dirichlet priors also have the advantageous property of being conjugate. Letting ij be a hyperparameter indexing the expected duration of regime i before switching to regime k 6 = i, the prior on P can be written:
where (:) is the gamma distribution. The Dirichlet prior enables a ‡exible framework for a variety of time variation including, for example, once-and-for-all shifts and, by letting h become arbitrarily large, di¤usion processes. Our application will not consider absorbing states and will keep the number of states small. We will, however, allow for switching in shock variances originating from a separate process from the one controlling shifts in parameters.
For our baseline speci…cation, we use priors that are well-suited for a monthly model. In particular, we specify k k = 1; 2; :::6 = f0:57; 0:13; 0:1; 1:2; 10; 10g and Dirichlet priors of 5:6 for both variances and coe¢ cients. With the values of k we begin with what Sims and Zha (1998) and SWZ (2008) suggest for monthly data. The Dirichlet priors we use are looser than what would be usually used for monthly data. They imply an 85 percent prior probability that the economy will, in the next period, continue in the same state as it is in the current period. This is a fairly low probability, consistent with the notion that shifts are associated with jumps in asset prices.
Robustness of priors selection
In this section we consider a range of robustness checks, devoted mostly to the measure of stress used. In one set of cases, we examine how narrowing our stress index by excluding classes of variables a¤ects the results. In the second set, we employ di¤erent priors. We note that because in all cases we are using alternative data, likelihood-based calculations are not comparable across models.
In broad terms, our preferred model is quite resilient to moderate changes in model priors. For example, if we alter the priors governing VAR coe¢ cients that we used following SZ (2006) with alternatives, such as those that SZ (2006) recommend for a quarterly model, we get, once again, three periods of high-stress coe¢ cients and many periods of switching in variances. Altering the Dirichlet prior such that higher persistence of regimes is somewhat favored returns what looks like the same results as we showed for our preferred model.
